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I. INTRODUCTION 
On August 30, 2011, Wikileaks released the latest batch of 
classified U.S. Department of State cables, revealing significant 
insights related to various aspects of the United States’ foreign and 
trade policy. In highlighting the severity of the leaks, The Economist 
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remarked, “if Cyberspace had air, it would be thick with 
recrimination.”1 Of particular interest to this paper are those cables 
related to the United States’ foreign policy implementing and 
enforcing intellectual property in developing countries. The leaks 
draw a bleak picture, in which U.S. interest groups and local agents 
collaborate to achieve higher levels of intellectual property 
protection in developing countries, without taking into consideration 
the public interest and consumer rights of local communities. This 
“act of state-sponsored violence,” as some have proclaimed it,2 
jeopardizes the lives of millions of citizens across the globe. It also 
undermines the foundations of the global multilateral trading regime 
and its institutions, particularly the World Trade Organization 
(“WTO”), which was created by the global community in 1995 to put 
an end to bilateralism and multilaterally regulate global trade in 
goods and services.  
Although the leaks contain references to many other U.S. 
initiatives and efforts aimed toward strengthening and enforcing 
intellectual property protection in many developing countries, this 
study will focus on those leaks related to the implementation of the 
U.S.-Jordan bilateral free trade agreement3 (“FTA”) signed in 2001 
in the area of intellectual property protection. Bilateral FTAs 
between powerful, industrialized countries and regions, particularly 
the United States and European Union, and poorer, developing 
countries have proliferated over the past decade. As now 
acknowledged by many, the signing of an FTA represents the 
beginning of a long and winding road, but there is little analysis of 
what actually happens following the conclusion of a bilateral free 
trade agreement. This is particularly true in the area of intellectual 
property protection, which affects the lives of millions in developing 
countries. One reason for the lack of analysis of the implementation 
of FTAs is that, in most cases, these agreements are negotiated, 
 
 1. Wikileaks: Swept Up and Away, ECONOMIST, Sept. 10, 2011, 
http://www.economist.com/node/21528600/print. 
 2. James Love, In Defense of WikiLeaks: Looking at Cables on 
Pharmaceutical Drugs and Trade Pressures, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 4, 2011, 
3:43 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/james-love/wikileaks-cables-
pharmaceutical-drugs_b_947806.html. 
 3. Agreement on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area, U.S.-Jordan, Oct. 
24, 2000, 41 I.L.M. 63 [hereinafter U.S.-Jordan FTA]. 
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signed, and implemented secretly, behind closed doors, with little 
public debate and participation.4 This study analyzes the 
implementation of the U.S.-Jordan FTA based on a thorough review 
of recent releases of the Wikileaks cables, supplemented by the 
observations and experience of the author in the region.  
This study is a first attempt at analyzing and explaining the 
process that transpires during the signing of an FTA between a 
developed and a developing country. The case of Jordan is 
invaluable for many reasons. First, the U.S.-Jordan FTA was the 
first FTA the United States signed with any Arab or Muslim 
country.5 Second, the U.S.-Jordan FTA was the first agreement of 
its type that contained several intellectual property obligations of a 
TRIPS-Plus nature.6 Third, the U.S.-Jordan FTA is one of the few 
agreements where the impacts of FTAs on developing countries 
have been studied. Research findings have alarmingly affirmed the 
negative impact arising from the implementation of comparable 
FTAs in developing countries, particularly in the area of public 
health and access to medicine.7 Within this context, this article will 
 
 4. See generally Brian J. Schoenborn, Public Participation in Trade 
Negotiations: Open Agreements, Openly Arrived At?, 4 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 
103, 135–37 (1995) (discussing the importance of balancing the democratic 
interest in public disclosure with the degree of confidentiality inherent in the 
contractual treaty negotiation process). 
 5. See Mohammed El Said, The Evolution of the Jordanian TRIPS-Plus 
Model: Multilateralism Versus Bilateralism and the Implications for the Jordanian 
IPRs Regime, 37 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 501, 513 (2006) 
[hereinafter El Said, Multilateralism Versus Bilateralism] (emphasizing the 
historical significance of the U.S.-Jordan FTA in that it has become a “cornerstone 
for the subsequent agreements signed between the US and other nations in the new 
era of trade bilateralism”); Background Note: Jordan, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Dec. 
30, 2011), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3464.htm. 
 6. Accord Mohammed El Said, The Road from TRIPS-Minus to TRIPS to 
TRIPS-Plus: Implications of IPRs for the Arab World, 8 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 
53, 61 (2005) (citing, for example, the obligation to “treat geographical indications 
as trademarks for the purposes of protection registration and implementation”); see 
Peter Drahos, BITS and BIPS: Bilateralism in Intellectual Property, 4 J. WORLD 
INTELL. PROP. 791, 792, 797–98 (2001) (explaining that “TRIPS Plus” may allow 
for more extensive protection than TRIPS standards, and it allows members to 
qualify, or choose amongst, TRIPS standards). 
 7. See MOHAMMED EL SAID, WORLD HEALTH ORG. & INT’L CTR. FOR TRADE 
& SUSTAINABLE DEV., PUBLIC HEALTH RELATED TRIPS-PLUS PROVISIONS IN 
BILATERAL TRADE AGREEMENTS: A POLICY GUIDE FOR NEGOTIATORS AND 
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use information obtained through Wikileaks to make a more 
detailed assessment of the process of surveillance and 
implementation that U.S. authorities undertook following the 
signing of a bilateral FTA.  
Although the main concern of this study is the domestic process 
associated with setting and creating intellectual property−protection 
norms and regulations in developing countries (particularly Jordan), 
the study also highlights how this process relates to the global 
debate over intellectual property norms. It reveals the rivalry 
between the main players—the United States and the European 
Union—in this area and their efforts to push the boundaries of 
intellectual property protection in developing countries. Based on 
this finding, the study explains the complexities associated with 
national norm-setting initiatives and concludes that the process of 
setting and implementing intellectual property norms at the national 
level should not be viewed in isolation from other major global 
developments. What this study will not do is delve into the 
substantive details of the intellectual property TRIPS-Plus 
provisions included under the U.S.-Jordan FTA, as this has been 
dealt with extensively elsewhere.8  
II. THE BEGINNINGS  
Jordan has maintained strong relations with the United States since 
its creation as an emirate in the early 1920s.9 Jordan’s geography, 
 
IMPLEMENTERS IN THE WHO EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN REGION 16 (2010) 
[hereinafter EL SAID, PUBLIC HEALTH RELATED TRIPS-PLUS PROVISIONS IN 
BILATERAL TRADE AGREEMENTS]; Mohammed El Said, All Costs, No Benefits: 
How TRIPS-Plus Intellectual Property Rules in the US-Jordan FTA Affect Access 
to Medicines, OXFAM INT’L (Oxfam Briefing Paper No. 102, 2007), at 2 (“[D]ata 
exclusivity [in Jordan] has delayed generic competition for 79 percent of 
medicines newly launched by 21 multinational pharmaceutical companies between 
2002 and mid-2008.”); Hamed El Said & Mohammed El Said, TRIPS-Plus 
Implications for Access to Medicines in Developing Countries: Lessons from 
Jordan-United States Free Trade Agreement, 10 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 438, 445 
(2007) (highlighting the vast shift IPR protection has undergone in Jordan since 
1973, at which time patent protection was only afforded to processes, which 
permitted the legal manufacture of generic drugs, which were developed, tested, 
and patented in other countries). 
 8. El Said, Multilateralism Versus Bilateralism, supra note 5. 
 9. E.g., Background Note: Jordan, supra note 5 (“Relations between the 
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demography, pragmatic leadership, and, more recently, its 
involvement in the United States’ “War on Terror” ensured 
continuous special relationships with various U.S. administrations, 
with few exceptions.10 
The close relationship between Jordan and the United States is 
evidenced by the exceptional military and financial support Jordan 
has received from the United States over the years.11 Jordan is one of 
the largest recipients of U.S. aid in the world. Since 1951, the 
country received approximately $11.38 billion in U.S. aid, third only 
to Israel and Egypt in the region.12 On September 22, 2008, the U.S. 
and Jordanian governments reached an agreement, whereby the 
United States would provide a total of $660 million in annual foreign 
assistance to Jordan over a five-year period.13  
Jordan has signed a number of bilateral agreements with the 
United States during the past two decades. For instance, a bilateral 
“open skies” Aviation Agreement and a Bilateral Investment Treaty 
(“BIT”) were signed between the two countries in 1996 and 2003, 
respectively.14 Additionally, in 1996, the U.S. Congress created 
Qualifying Industrial Zones (“QIZ”) to support the peace process 
through the peace treaty signed between Jordan and Israel in 1994.15 
 
United States and Jordan have been close for 6 decades, with 2009 marking the 
60th anniversary of U.S.-Jordanian ties.”). 
 10. But see id. (providing a notable exception to the generally favorable 
relations between Jordan and the United States relating to disagreements over the 
country’s support for Iraq during the first Gulf War (1990-91)). 
 11. See generally AVI SHLAIM, LION OF JORDAN: THE LIFE OF KING HUSSEIN IN 
WAR AND PEACE (2007) (tracing the history of Jordan with respect to the Arab-
Israeli conflict and identifying the level of military and financial assistance 
received from the United States). 
 12. JEREMY M. SHARP, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32260, U.S. FOREIGN 
ASSISTANCE TO THE MIDDLE EAST: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND, RECENT TRENDS, 
AND THE FY2011 REQUEST 7 (2010), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/ 
mideast/RL32260.pdf. 
 13. Id. at 7. 
 14. Air Transport Agreement Between the Government of the United States of 
America and the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, U.S.-Jordan, 
Nov. 10, 1996, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/66317.pdf; Treaty 
Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of 
the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal 
Protection of Investment, U.S.-Jordan, July 2, 1997, U.S. Sen. Treaty Doc. 106-30. 
 15. West Bank and Gaza Strip Free Trade Benefits, Pub. L. No. 104-234, 110 
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Under the agreement, QIZ goods that contain at least twelve percent 
of their value added from Israel enter the United States tariff- and 
quota-free. This has had important economic growth implications for 
the Jordanian economy and turned the United States into Jordan’s 
main trading partner (replacing Iraq) by encouraging and increasing 
Jordan’s exportation of light manufactured products such as 
garments. 
The two countries signed a Science and Technology Cooperation 
Agreement in 2007 to facilitate and strengthen mutual scientific 
cooperation, as well as a memorandum of understanding on nuclear 
energy cooperation.16 U.S. backing ensured Jordan’s speedy 
accession to the WTO in 2000 and subsequently paved the way for 
the signing of the first bilateral FTA between the United States and 
an Arab country in 2001 (the U.S.-Jordan FTA).17  
High levels of collaboration between the two countries in the area 
of intellectual property have existed for some time. However, it was 
often U.S. pressure, triggered by industry groups, that dictated the 
terms of the relationship between the two countries. For instance, 
until 1999 Jordan was still placed on the United States’ “Section 301 
Watch List.”18 The following year, the Pharmaceutical Research and 
Manufacturers of America (“PhRMA”) went even further by 
formally asking the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative 
(“USTR”) to name Jordan in the next year as a “Priority Watch” 
country, for “failing to provide adequate intellectual property 
protection.”19 The relationship became less turbulent following the 
country’s accession to the WTO and its signing of the FTA with the 
 
Stat. 3058. 
 16. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and 
the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan on Science and Technology 
Cooperation, U.S.-Jordan, Apr. 5, 2007, http://www.state.gov/documents/ 
organization/142911.pdf. 
 17. Background Note: Jordan, supra note 5. 
 18. See, Matthew K. Miller, Hong Kong Removed from U.S. Trade 
Representative’s Special 301 Watch List, 5 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 12, 12, n.23 
(1999) (providing a general overview of the Special 301 Watch List as a warning 
signal to the business community and foreign nations that deny adequate 
intellectual property protection). 
 19. Ghalia Alul, PhRMA Requests Jordan Be Placed on “Priority Watch” List, 
JORDAN TIMES, Apr. 15, 1998, available at http://www.jordanembassyus.org/ 
041598002.htm. 
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United States in 2000 and 2001, respectively.  
III. DOMESTIC PROCESS, GLOBAL AGENDA  
The information revealed in Wikileaks reinforces the widely 
acknowledged view that the international regulation of intellectual 
property was deliberately designed with loopholes that could be 
exploited by its drafters. As one author explains:  
Since TRIPs, the institutional environment around intellectual property 
has gotten much denser, much thicker, and much more heavily populated 
with new forums and new actors. The result is an increasingly incoherent 
and internally inconsistent intellectual property regime. Much of this 
incoherence is a product of strategic forum shifting, in which actors take 
their intellectual property concerns to the forums in which they expect to 
better achieve their goals. Various interest groups and government 
agencies have become heavily invested in increasingly ineffective 
approaches to property protection and enforcement.20 
The case of Jordan not only conforms to these observations but 
also sheds new light on the inconsistencies and loopholes present in 
intellectual property regulation, given the explicit influence of the 
U.S. government and its lobbyists throughout the negotiation 
process. Persuasion, motivation, and threats are some of the tools 
used to influence negotiations. These mechanisms are often used 
interchangeably to implement and enforce high-level intellectual 
property protection (what is often referred to in the literature as 
TRIPS-Plus provisions) in many developing countries, including 
Jordan.  
The United States’ position is formulated primarily by the 
collaborative effort of several private interest groups and 
governmental agencies that share a unified vision for seeking the 
implementation and enforcement of higher intellectual property 
protection levels—often of a TRIPS-Plus nature—with their FTA 
partner state. These groups and agencies rely on various strategies in 
achieving their objectives. The strategies are often complemented by 
a “revolving door” policy, through initiating discussions with and 
passing messages to various local contacts and other concerned 
 
 20. Susan Sell, Everything Old Is New Again: The Development Agenda Then 
and Now, 3 WIPO J. 17, 21 (2011). 
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official departments and authorities.  
A snapshot of the main players involved in this process shows an 
intricate web of exchanges and discussions between Jordanian and 
American key players. However, it is important first to identify and 
explain the role of each of these players and how this process shapes 
their positions and objectives.  
The key players representing the private sector interests of the 
United States include a number of historically well-established 
and organized business groups and associations. For instance, both 
the Business Software Alliance (“BSA”)21 and the International 
Intellectual Property Alliance (“IIPA”)22 have been vocal in their 
push for strengthened copyright protection in Jordan. Meanwhile, 
the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America 
(“PhRMA”)23 continues to pursue higher levels of intellectual 
property protection in the area of pharmaceutical patents in the 
country. These business groups and associations are also 
supported by their local representatives, agents, and networks of 
contacts.  
Unsurprisingly, these business associations were also the most 
vocal advocates and enthusiasts for inclusion of strong provisions 
 
 21. Cf. BUS. SOFTWARE ALLIANCE, http://www.bsa.org/GlobalHome.aspx (last 
visited Aug. 16, 2012) (presenting the BSA as the “voice of the world’s 
commercial software industry and its hardware partners before governments and in 
the international marketplace. BSA programs foster technology innovation through 
education and policy initiatives that promote copyright protection, cyber security, 
trade, and e-commerce.”). 
 22. Cf. About IIPA, INT’L INTELLECTUAL PROP. ALLIANCE (Feb. 9, 2012), 
http://www.iipa.com/aboutiipa.html (describing the IIPA as “a private sector 
coalition, formed in 1984, consisting of trade associations representing U.S. 
copyright-based industries in bilateral and multilateral efforts working to improve 
international protection and enforcement of copyrighted materials, and open up 
foreign markets closed by piracy and other market access barriers”). 
 23. Cf. About PhRMA, PHRMA.ORG, http://www.phrma.org/about/about-
phrma (last visited Aug. 12, 2012) (“The Pharmaceutical Research and 
Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) represents the US’s leading pharmaceutical 
research and biotechnology companies, which are devoted to inventing medicines 
that allow patients to live longer, healthier, and more productive lives. PhRMA 
companies are leading the way in the search for new cures. PhRMA members 
alone invested an estimated $49.4 billion in 2010 in discovering and developing 
new medicines. Industry-wide research and investment reached an estimated $67.4 
billion in 2010.”). 
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for intellectual property protection—through the implementation of 
the TRIPS Agreement—during the Uruguay Round of Trade 
Negotiations. The Uruguay Round lasted from 1986 to 1994 and 
culminated in the birth of the WTO. Their efforts were highly 
influential in lobbying the U.S. government to include intellectual 
property protection in the negotiations agenda and in pressuring 
other developing countries to implement higher levels of 
intellectual property protection. Commenting on the role of such 
groups, one author explains:  
These private actors were in a good position in so far as they represented 
vigorous export industries that enjoyed positive balances . . . . They were 
able to present their industries as part of the solution to America’s trade 
woes, as opposed to being part of the problem. They successfully argued 
that foreign pirates, particularly in East Asia and Latin America, were 
robbing them of hard-earned royalties. They pushed hard for a trade-based 
approach to IP protection.24  
Today, these same players continue to pursue a “maximalist” 
approach to intellectual property and pressure the U.S. government 
to pursue higher levels of intellectual property protection and 
enforcement in developing countries. Just as in the economic crises 
of the 1970s, U.S. industry representatives today present intellectual 
property as a cure for present-day economic woes and financial 
crises.25  
Several U.S. government agencies and bodies also constitute key 
players, given their ability to provide official coverage and to 
exercise political clout and economic leverage. The U.S. Embassy in 
Amman, which often acts as a medium in interactions involving U.S. 
players and stakeholders; the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative 
(“USTR”); the U.S. Agency for International Development 
(“USAID”) and its Achievement of Market-Friendly Initiatives and 
Results (“AMIR”) Program in Jordan; and the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office (“USPTO”) appear to be the most active and 
persevering agencies in the push for higher intellectual property 
 
 24. SUSAN SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 86 (2003). 
 25. Deborah Halbert, The Politics of IP Maximalism, 3 WIPO J. 81, 90 (2011). 
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protection and enforcement.26 Other agencies and private bodies are 
periodically called upon to step in and provide legal review or 
technical training and advice. These include the U.S. Food and Drug 
Authority (“USFDA”), the Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”), 
the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), and the Library 
of the U.S. Congress (“LOC”). In addition, a number of local 
representatives of large U.S. multinational enterprises (“MNEs”)—
such as Microsoft, Caterpillar, and Chrysler—and other industry 
representatives also attended and actively participated in a number of 
workshops and seminars focusing on intellectual property protection 
and enforcement in Jordan.  
On the other hand, the cables clearly reveal inadequate levels of 
representation from Jordanian enterprises, agencies, and corporations 
in developing intellectual property norms at the national level. In a 
situation often prevalent in developing and Arab countries, the 
Jordanian position is generally “responsive” with regard to 
intellectual property protection.27 Consequently, the limited and 
sometimes targeted participation may be confined to a small number 
of agencies and/or ministries when discussions on intellectual 
property ensue. The main players from the Jordanian side feature the 
Ministry of Industry and Trade, the official authority entrusted with 
managing industrial property protection in the country; the National 
Library, the authority concerned with copyright and neighboring 
rights protection, which is part of the Ministry of Culture; and the 
Jordan Food and Drug Administration (“JFDA”), an agency 
concerned mainly with granting marketing authorizations for drugs 
and pharmaceutical products in the country and that is affiliated with 
the Jordanian Ministry of Health.  
 
 26. See, e.g., GIPA - Patent, Trademark, and Copyright Law and Policy 
Program - November 5-8, 2007, Amman, Jordan, USPTO, http://www.uspto.gov/ 
ip/events/agenda_jordan.jsp (last visited Aug. 12, 2012) (describing one of the 
USPTO’s training programs run by its Global Intellectual Property Academy 
(GIPA) in Jordan in 2007). 
 27. MOHAMMED EL SAID, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
PROTECTION IN THE ARAB WORLD 46 (2008) [hereinafter EL SAID, THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION IN THE ARAB WORLD] 
(“These countries often ‘traded away’ the issue of intellectual property in exchange 
for concessions in other areas without carefully assessing the impact of these trade-
offs.”). 
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In addition, other agencies, officials, and individuals are called 
upon in cases where procedural or administrative issues persist, 
where additional enforcement levels are sought, or where technical 
and legal training and advice are offered.28 Of these, one can identify 
the Jordan Institute for Standards and Metrology (“JISM”), the 
Jordan Customs Department (“JCD”), and the judiciary as recurring 
players. Unlike the United States’ private-sector business groups, 
local business groups are fragmented and seem to have limited 
presence and influence over the intellectual property policies of the 
government in Jordan. On occasion, some local businesses even 
align their business interests with those of their U.S. counterparts.29  
Overall, the dynamics of the relationship between these 
stakeholders and representatives (both from the United States and 
Jordan) reflect a general pattern of encouragement and collaboration 
where positions are unified.30 When positions are not, criticism is 
often associated with suspension—or threat of suspension—of funds 
from the U.S. side as a stick-and-carrot policy.  
What is of concern here is the evident lack of public input and the 
absence of public participation and civil society representation in these 
discussions, particularly from the Jordanian side. As will be discussed 
in more detail in the ensuing parts of this article, the main theme 
emerging from the discussions and negotiations between the U.S. 
teams and their Jordanian counterparts is the drive to raise levels of 
intellectual property protection and enforcement in Jordan, without 
undertaking a proper impact assessment or inviting national debate 
about the effects of these provisions on society and consumers. 
 
 28. See ALEXANDER W. KOFF ET AL., INT’L INTELLECTUAL PROP. INST., STUDY 
ON THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF “TRIPS-PLUS” FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS 35 
(2011), available at http://www.tradepartnership.com/pdf_files/IIPI%20TRIPS-
Plus%20Study.pdf (reporting that the United States’ technical assistance has 
provided “not only seminars and short training courses but also a group on the 
ground in Peru to assist with intellectual property efforts”). 
 29. For instance, the Jordan Intellectual Property Association (JIPA) often 
advocates a pro-protection intellectual property approach. 
 30. For instance, to intensify the raids against copyright infringers, an 
agreement between the National Library and the Business Software Alliance 
(BSA) was signed with the aim of identifying those involved in illegal activities. 
U.S. Embassy, Cable 05AMMAN8330, Jordan IPR Problems and Solutions: 
Part I - Awareness Campaign Tackles Street-Smart Pirates (Oct. 23, 2005), 
available at http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/10/05AMMAN8330.html. 
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Instead, the key players insert intellectual property rhetoric into 
discussions and deliberations, describing higher levels of protection 
and enforcement as an anchor for attracting businesses, high 
technology and know-how, and foreign direct investment (“FDI”), 
without providing substantial evidence supporting such claims.  
The next part of this article will present specific examples that 
demonstrate the United States’ tactics in mobilizing its stakeholders 
and governmental agencies in pursuance of strengthened TRIPS-Plus 
intellectual property protection levels and enforcement procedures in 
Jordan.  
IV. LAYING DOWN THE FOUNDATIONS  
Because the U.S.-Jordan FTA was the first FTA signed between 
the United States and an Arab or a Muslim state, the agreement 
became a template for subsequent FTAs signed in the Middle East. 
Moreover, the U.S.-Jordan FTA was one of the first bilateral 
agreements to include extensive TRIPS-Plus provisions. These 
provisions had noticeable impacts on many development-related 
areas.31 In particular, the agreement contains several TRIPS-Plus 
provisions, which directly affect public health and access to medicine 
in the country. These may be summarized as follows: 
1. Data exclusivity protection. The U.S.-Jordan FTA obliges 
Jordan to provide legal protection for data exclusivity for a 
period that may be extended up to eight years. Accordingly, 
article 4.22 of the FTA states: 
Pursuant to Article 39.3 of TRIPS, each Party, when requiring, 
as a condition of approving the marketing of pharmaceutical or 
of agricultural chemical products that utilize new chemical 
entities, the submission of undisclosed test or other data, or 
evidence of approval in another country, the origination of which 
involves a considerable effort, shall protect such information 
against unfair commercial use. In addition, each Party shall 
protect such information against disclosure, except where 
 
 31. See EL SAID, PUBLIC HEALTH RELATED TRIPS-PLUS PROVISIONS IN 
BILATERAL TRADE AGREEMENTS, supra note 7 (suggesting that as a result of 
signing FTAs, countries in the Eastern Mediterranean Region face difficulties in 
creating the proper and adequate public health regimes and in ensuring the 
availability and access to medicine for their populations). 
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necessary to protect the public or unless steps are taken to ensure 
that the information is protected against unfair commercial use.32 
2. “New use” legal protection for chemical entities. Although 
the TRIPS Agreement does not oblige member states to 
provide legal protection for “new use,” the U.S.-Jordan FTA 
includes references to this type of protection. In this regard, a 
footnote to article 4.22 states: 
It is understood that protection for “new chemical entities” shall 
also include protection for new uses for old chemical entities for 
a period of three years.33 
3. Patent-term extension. Article 33 of the TRIPS Agreement 
provides that legal protection shall be granted to patents for a 
period of twenty years from the date of filing. The U.S.-
Jordan FTA further extends this period to compensate the 
applicant for the time spent during the examination of the 
application and/or marketing authorization. Article 4.23 of 
the U.S.-Jordan FTA states:  
With respect to pharmaceutical products that are subject to a 
patent: 
a. Each Party shall make available an extension of the patent 
term to compensate the patent owner for unreasonable 
curtailment of the patent term as a result of the marketing 
approval process.34 
4. Restrictions on compulsory licensing. The TRIPS Agreement 
grants member states the right to grant compulsory licenses. 
However, the agreement does not list or specify the grounds 
whereby such licenses may be granted but instead awards 
member states the discretion to define such grounds.35 On the 
 
 32. U.S.-Jordan FTA, supra note 3, art. 4.22. A footnote to article 4.22 further 
states: “It is understood that, in situations where there is reliance on evidence of 
approval in another country, Jordan shall at a minimum protect such information 
against unfair commercial use for the same period of time the other country is 
protecting such information against unfair commercial use.” Id. art. 4.22 n.11. 
 33. Id. art. 4.22 n.10. 
 34. Id. art. 4.23. 
 35. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 
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other hand, the U.S.-Jordan FTA lists the grounds on which 
such licenses may be granted, hence eroding the policy space 
available to Jordan by broadly defining these grounds. 
Accordingly, article 4.20 of the FTA states: 
Neither Party shall permit the use of the subject matter of a 
patent without the authorization of the right holder except in the 
following circumstances: 
to remedy a practice determined after judicial or 
administrative process to be anti-competitive; 
in cases of public non-commercial use or in the case of a 
national emergency or other circumstances of extreme 
urgency, provided that such use is limited to use by 
government entities or legal entities acting under the 
authority of a government; or 
on the ground of failure to meet working requirements, 
provided that importation shall constitute working.36 
The impact of these TRIPS-Plus conditions in the area of public 
health and access to medicine is grave. In brief, such measures would 
result in prolonging the monopoly terms granted to pharmaceutical 
patents and delaying the entrance of generics into the market.37 Such 
delays would result in a substantial increase in drug prices, due to 
royalty payments, and would increase governmental expenditure on 
public health and medicine as a result.38 Some of these effects, as will 
be explained in more detail, have already taken place in the country.  
 
Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods art. 30, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal 
Instruments — Results of the Uruguay Round, 108 Stat. 4809, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 
[hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. 
 36. U.S.-Jordan FTA, supra note 3, art. 4.20. 
 37. See KOFF ET AL., supra note 28, at 49 (“Reportedly overlaying U.S.-style 
rules over Jordan’s pharmaceutical sector negatively affects the ability of generic 
industries to operate, which is why many from Jordan’s generic pharmaceutical 
industry view the FTA as TRIPS-‘Minus.’”). 
 38. For more, see EL SAID, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
PROTECTION IN THE ARAB WORLD, supra note 27. 
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V. COSTS WITHOUT BENEFITS: THE MYTHS 
After laying the foundation for TRIPS-Plus obligations under the 
national legal framework through the FTA, the United States moved 
next to interpreting the obligations during their implementation. The 
leaked cables provide some interesting illustrations about how the 
United States monitors the implementation of intellectual property 
obligations of its FTA partner states, particularly with regard to those 
commitments related to pharmaceutical patents. More specifically, 
the cables explain the interplay between concerned authorities and 
groups in both the United States and Jordan and the approach adopted 
by each in dealing with intellectual property issues affecting public 
health and access to medicine. In general, the U.S. position, backed 
by its powerful industry interest groups, is centered on interpreting 
intellectual property commitments widely, with a TRIPS-Plus 
approach, and conflating public health issues with those related to 
intellectual property protection. The Jordanian position, on the other 
hand, could be best described as “reactive,” in most cases, and 
“reluctant,” in other cases, to heed to the United States’ demands.  
The following examples illustrate in greater detail the interplay 
between these various players in relation to a number of issues 
affecting public health and access to medicine, as revealed by the 
leaks.  
Data exclusivity appears to be one of the major issues of concern 
to the United States included under the U.S.-Jordan FTA.39 Data 
exclusivity refers to the procedure wherein originative 
pharmaceutical companies are granted a period of time during which 
would-be generic producers of existing drugs are prohibited from 
obtaining regulatory approval for a competing drug if they rely on 
the results of the originator’s clinical trials. Although legal protection 
regimes granting data exclusivity predate the signing of the TRIPS 
Agreement,40 the United States’ and European Union’s attempts to 
 
 39. See Guatemala’s Congress Reinstates Data Protection: The End of the 
Problem That Refused to Go Away, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L (Mar. 3, 2010), 
http://www.keionline.org/node/1206 (providing a detailed account of U.S. 
government pressure on the Guatemalan legislature to shape legislation on 
pharmaceutical test data protection in the country). 
 40. See Jerome H. Reichman, Rethinking the Role of Clinical Trial Data in 
International Intellectual Property Law: The Case for a Public Goods Approach, 
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include data exclusivity protection under the auspices of the TRIPS 
Agreement were met by fierce resistance. Due to objections from 
developing countries, data exclusivity provisions were ultimately 
excluded from the TRIPS Agreement.41 However, the United 
States—and more recently the European Union—reintroduced data 
exclusivity through bilateral FTAs with a number of countries. These 
agreements created a de facto legal international protection regime 
for data exclusivity, by virtue of article 4 of the TRIPS Agreement, 
relating to the most-favored nation (“MFN”) principle.42  
In the case of Jordan, the issue of data-exclusivity protection 
features extensively in the U.S. cables, despite the global criticism 
that data exclusivity has attracted in recent years.43 Fears of the 
monopolistic impact of patent-term extension on drug prices and the 
curtailment of compulsory licensing appear to have been realized in 
Jordan. Nonetheless, Jordan became one of the first Arab countries in 
which the issue of data exclusivity surfaced during discussions with 
U.S. officials following the signing of the U.S.-Jordan FTA, as 
revealed by the cables.  
As stated above, the U.S.-Jordan FTA introduces five years of data 
exclusivity that commences on the date of registration of a medicine 
in the country.44 An additional three years of data exclusivity 
(beyond the initial five-year period) are also granted for new uses of 
known chemical entities.45 The U.S. cables show how the United 
 
13 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 12–16 (2009) (explaining that NAFTA 
included some reference to data exclusivity protection, while the European 
Community member states have provided protection for data filed in support of 
marketing authorizations for pharmaceuticals since 1987). 
 41. Id. at 17–19. 
 42. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 35, art. 4 (“With regard to the protection of 
intellectual property, any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by a 
Member to the nationals of any other country shall be accorded immediately and 
unconditionally to the nationals of all other Members.”) 
 43. See U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, GOOD PRACTICE GUIDE: IMPROVING ACCESS 
TO TREATMENT BY UTILIZING PUBLIC HEALTH FLEXIBILITIES IN THE WTO TRIPS 
AGREEMENT 24–26 (2010) [hereinafter UNDP], available at http://apps.who.int/ 
medicinedocs/documents/s17762en/s17762en.pdf (identifying “data exclusivity” 
as “an additional market protection form for originator pharmaceuticals” and 
advising developing nations to refrain from adopting data exclusivity regimes). 
 44. U.S.-Jordan FTA, supra note 3, art. 4.22 n.11. 
 45. Id., art. 4.22 n.10. 
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States attempted to interpret these provisions in ways that favor its 
industry’s interests and views.  
One cable dating back to 2005 stated that international 
pharmaceutical companies seem to be generally satisfied with the 
drug-registration system in Jordan, which is managed mainly by the 
Jordan Food and Drug Administration (“JFDA”).46 Despite this, it 
was evident that the United States was not satisfied with the 
pro−public health approach often adopted by JFDA’s committees. 
The 2005 cable further describes the committees operating under the 
JFDA as “multi-agency committees [that] do not have the same 
reputation [as the JFDA], being holdovers from a former paternalistic 
era of healthcare.”47 As demonstrated by the same cable, the United 
States attempted on several occasions to influence the decisions of 
the JDFA and its committees. In one data exclusivity dispute, the 
2005 cable reports: 
[A] company filed for protection for a once-a-week-dose drug in 2004 
less than a year before the daily dosing would lose its data exclusivity 
protection (for the clinical data that, once in the public domain, would 
allow a generic firm to make the same drug and market it at reduced 
costs) . . . .48  
After reaching the court, the case was “dismissed on a technicality 
unrelated to the substantive dispute.” Unsatisfied with this result, 
which, in the eyes of the U.S. embassy, meant that the generic 
company had “won” the dispute, the cable explains that: 
Some in the PhRMA community believe it was a breach of the law for the 
[government of Jordan] to fail to uphold the FTA obligation to protect 
data submitted for the once-weekly dose, regardless of any lawyer court 
decision. However, to maintain harmonious relations with its regulator, 
the aggrieved company—which continues to believe itself to have been 
 
 46. See U.S. Embassy, Cable 05AMMAN9748, Jordan’s IPRS Challenges and 
Solutions: Part III - Pharmaceuticals Pose Frontier IPR Issues ¶ 3 (Dec. 19, 2005), 
http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/12/05AMMAN9748.html# (“International R&D-
based drug firms are comfortable with the registration system in Jordan; to date, 
Embassy received no complaints of excessive bureaucracy or delayed decisions by 
the JFDA.”). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. ¶ 4. 
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wronged—decided not to pursue the case.49  
Disregarding the independence of the Jordanian judiciary and the 
fact that the FTA itself did not include such an obligation, the cable 
boldly states:  
The weekly-dose case raises the general problem with data exclusivity 
and NCE’s [new chemical entities] in Jordan. For example, an adult 
dosage, a children’s dose, and a pre-school or infant dose—each with its 
own set of data in support of JFDA approval—should receive, each in its 
own turn, five years of protection, according to the manufacturer. But the 
JFDA can’t square that proposition with its view of a single NCE 
deserving only one period of five-year protection. As PhRMA and 
individual companies read it, the FTA appears to come down more 
strongly in favor of protections from “unfair competition” and to be more 
favorable toward data exclusivity in the narrowest sense, for each dose. 
The main FTA provisions on drugs—FTA Article 4, paragraph 22 and its 
related footnotes—have yet to be interpreted in a manner acceptable to 
all, however.50 
If the United States had gotten its way, an additional protection 
period would have prevented the generic medicine from entering the 
market, a provision that would have hurt domestic consumers. The 
U.S. interpretation takes a clear pro-protection approach that favors 
U.S. pharmaceutical manufacturers but disregards the public interests 
of developing countries.  
In another case, a dispute over a cancer treatment raised the issue 
of when the exclusivity period actually begins: when the drug is first 
used under a tender or when it is first approved by the regulator. An 
embassy cable reports that, in 2001, an originative firm’s cancer 
treatment was approved for tender in a Jordanian government 
hospital.51 Afterward, the manufacturer filed a formal request for 
JFDA approval. However, in 2005, a generic of the same drug, 
produced by an Australian company, appeared on the market, less 
than five years after the original drug had received JFDA approval.52 
In response to the complaint, the JFDA Director General explained 
 
 49. Id. ¶ 5. 
 50. Id. ¶ 6. 
 51. Id. ¶ 9. In these special tender cases, a waiver is often obtained through the 
traditional JFDA approval process. 
 52. Id. 
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that JFDA officials reasoned that the drug had enjoyed five years of 
data exclusivity, dating from the special tender bid in 2001.53  
The innovator manufacturer disagreed, arguing that the data 
exclusivity period began with the more recent JFDA approval.54 The 
JFDA maintained its position that the same rule applies to all 
situations: the data exclusivity period begins the moment a drug gets 
approval under the tender and not upon subsequent registration.55 
Unhappy with the JFDA’s interpretation, the U.S. Embassy called for 
a review of the FTA, while USAID’s AMIR program called upon 
legal consultants to conduct a gap analysis to provide legislative 
recommendations.56 The U.S. Embassy went even further, boldly 
urging that Jordan’s JFDA should include a PhRMA representative 
on the High Committee for Drugs.57 This request clearly reflects a 
high level of U.S. interference in the work of the JFDA. Conversely, 
the United States would likely object if the same request was made 
by a Jordanian—or even a European—delegation demanding the 
inclusion of their representative on the board of the U.S. Food and 
Drug Administration (“USFDA”).  
The two previous examples demonstrate how the United States 
attempted to broadly interpret FTA provisions and to influence the 
decisions of public health authorities in Jordan, so as to grant longer 
protection periods of data exclusivity to pharmaceutical innovators. 
It also shows how U.S. authorities tried to influence the process of 
granting approvals to generic medicines, in accordance with 
PhRMA’s interpretation. However, the FTA itself does not contain 
any provisions that obligate Jordan to interpret the agreement in line 
with the United States’ position.58  
Empirical research also supports the argument that data exclusivity 
protection measures had negative effects on public health in Jordan. 
 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. ¶ 10. 
 57. Id. (urging the JFDA to consider including a “PhRMA representative 
among three private sector members on the committee”). 
 58. For more on impact, see EL SAID, PUBLIC HEALTH RELATED TRIPS-PLUS 
PROVISIONS IN BILATERAL TRADE AGREEMENTS, supra note 7, and UNDP, supra 
note 43. 
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In 2007, Oxfam International published a study on the U.S.-Jordan 
FTA.59 This study was one of the earliest that analyzed the impact of 
FTAs upon public health and access to medicine in developing 
countries. The findings of the study were alarming; they explicitly 
stated that the U.S.-Jordan FTA had a negative impact on access to 
medicine, finding that:  
• TRIPS-plus rules, particularly data exclusivity, 
independently prevented generic competition for 79 per 
cent of medicines launched by 21 multinational 
pharmaceutical companies since 2001. 
• Additional expenditures for medicines with no generic 
competitor, as a result of enforcement of data exclusivity, 
were between $6.3m and $22.04m.60 
In addition to the issue of data exclusivity, the U.S.-Jordan FTA 
also included references to the protection of “new use.”61 New-use 
protection aims at enabling new uses of known substances by issuing 
a patent on the new use(s). Therefore, if a certain drug was found to 
work in another field in which it was not protected, an additional 
period of patent protection could be awarded for an already known 
and registered drug, thereby extending the patent protection term 
substantially. This process is referred to as “evergreening.”62  
Once again, the cables provide evidence of how the United States 
attempted to interpret broadly TRIPS-Plus provisions related to new 
use, as stipulated under the U.S.-Jordan FTA. In one dispute, a drug 
used as an anti-asthma therapy came onto the market in 2005, but 
new chemical data trials showed that the drug was also effective for 
 
 59. OXFAM INT’L, ALL COSTS, NO BENEFITS: HOW TRIPS-PLUS INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RULES IN THE US-JORDAN FTA AFFECT ACCESS TO MEDICINES (2007), 
available at http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/all%20costs,%20 
no%20benefits.pdf. 
 60. Id. at 20. For a more recent study, see Ryan B. Abbott et al., The Price of 
Medicines in Jordan: The Cost of Trade-Based Intellectual Property, 9 J. GENERIC 
MEDS. 75 (2012). 
 61. See U.S.-Jordan FTA, supra note 3, art. 4.22 n.10 (“It is understood that 
protection for ‘new chemical entities’ shall also include protection for new uses for 
old chemical entities for a period of three years.”). 
 62. See generally C. Scott Hemphill & Bhaven N. Sampat, Evergreening, 
Patent Challenges, and Effective Market Life in Pharmaceuticals, COLUMBIA 
UNIVERSITY LAW AND ECONOMICS WORKING PAPER, No. 399 (May 3, 2011). 
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those patients exhibiting both asthma and co-existing allergic 
rhinitis. The JFDA approved the drug for the “new use,” but not for a 
“new indication,” as U.S. representatives were asking for. The JFDA 
justified its position by claiming that the “gray area of overlapping 
uses does not permit a distinction,” and it argued that it was therefore 
unwilling to grant an additional three years of exclusivity 
protection.63 The JFDA’s reasoning supported domestic public 
interest considerations.  
The cables revealed PhRMA’s outrage on this issue; in PhRMA’s 
view, when a product was approved for a new use, the period of data 
exclusivity should be expanded from five to eight years, at minimum, 
for that new use.64 The cable states that “after the innovator appealed, 
and when [embassy officials] highlighted the appeal for the JFDA 
[Director General], it appears the JFDA will be taking a second, 
harder look at what ‘protection’ means.”65 It was not clear how the 
JFDA handled the issue of new use following the appeal.  
Scrutinizing the cables, a sense of frustration on the part of the 
U.S. officials is evident, as a result of JFDA’s reluctant approach to 
award additional TRIPS-Plus protection to drug manufacturers. This 
frustration is apparent despite the fact that the JFDA’s position was 
influenced by domestic public health considerations. The cables 
further demonstrate U.S. dissatisfaction with the JFDA’s drug-
approval process. One cable states that “[a]dding to manufacturer’s 
concerns, the JFDA includes an extra layer of safety to its drug 
approval process by requiring that a drug be on the open market in 
one of seven countries with high safety standards for a full year 
before it can receive a formal approval in Jordan.”66 The cable 
unearths complaints about this strict requirement and the fact that the 
JFDA’s drug-approval process may last up to a period of six months, 
stating that “PhRMA companies deem this a technical barrier to 
market access.”67 The U.S. position is tenuous, as the TRIPS 
Agreement and the U.S.-Jordan FTA do not contain any obligations 
for Jordan in this area but rather leave space for Jordan to set policy 
 
 63. U.S. Embassy, Cable 05AMMAN9748, supra note 46. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
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in line with its national legal framework and administrative 
procedures.  
Dissatisfied that its discussions with the JFDA were largely 
fruitless, the United States decided it was time to widen the scope of 
the debate and engage other national players in the discussion. The 
United States decided the next step would be to engage the Ministry 
of Industry and Trade, bypassing the Ministry of Health altogether. It 
was time to bring the FTA’s most powerful card to the table.  
Through several exchanges with the U.S. Embassy, the JFDA, and 
the Ministry of Industry and Trade, the United States demanded that 
the government of Jordan abide “scrupulously” by its FTA 
commitments regarding pharmaceuticals protection.68 Accordingly, it 
would be imperative that more bilateral consultation be established 
to implement the obligations of the FTA. The cable further explains 
that the USAID’s AMIR program had already called upon legal 
consultants to conduct a gap analysis to study whether relevant 
legislation might be lacking in the country. As mentioned above, the 
Embassy went even further, by boldly asking the JFDA to include a 
PhRMA representative on the High Committee for Drugs.69 
Additionally, the cable reports that the United States requested that 
the Ministry of Industry and Trade—which seems to have been more 
receptive to U.S. demands—should also have a member on the High 
Committee for Drugs.70 Moreover, following one of the joint 
meetings attended by the Minister of Industry and Trade, the JFDA 
Director General, and U.S. Embassy representatives, the Minister of 
Industry and Trade told U.S. representatives that Jordan wished to be 
consistent with “international best practices and adhere to the 
FTA.”71  
The cable further reports that the Minister assured the 
representatives Jordan would rectify the situation if its practices were 
not in line with its FTA obligations.72 This reference reflects a 
questionable position, considering that the notion of a uniform 
“international best practices” does not exist in this particular area, 
 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. ¶ 10. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
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where countries typically exercise considerable discretion. In any 
case, the cable went further, reporting that the government of Jordan 
had invited the U.S. government to provide its own “position papers 
outlining any concerns” about the “international best practices.”73 
The cables did not reveal what advice the United States gave in 
relation to this request.  
The United States has often proclaimed that these FTAs 
(containing strengthened intellectual property rules of a TRIPS-Plus 
nature) would facilitate and encourage technology transfer and 
increase foreign direct investment (“FDI”) flows to its partner FTA 
states,74 a claim that is unfortunately echoed by many uninformed 
national politicians.75 For instance, a report published in 2004 by the 
International Intellectual Property Institute (“IIPI) in partnership with 
the AMIR program claimed that stronger intellectual property 
protections are helping to transform Jordan into the leading 
knowledge economy in the region and that Jordan’s pharmaceutical 
sector has actually benefited from the strengthening of its intellectual 
property regime.76 The report also claims that there is a growing 
 
 73. Id. 
 74. See Jordan Free Trade Agreement, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE 
REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/ 
jordan-fta/ (last visited Aug. 14, 2012) (“The United States-Jordan FTA has 
expanded the trade relationship by reducing barriers for services, providing 
cutting-edge protection for intellectual property, ensuring regulatory transparency, 
and requiring effective labor and environmental enforcement.”). 
 75. See, e.g., Ferris K. Nesheiwat, The Adoption of Intellectual Property 
Standards Beyond TRIPS – Is It a Misguided Legal and Economic Obsession by 
Developing Countries?, 32 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 361, 366 (2010) 
(“Jordanian officials, most notably the under-secretary for Industry and Trade, 
consistently cite the adoption of modern intellectual property laws in Jordan as a 
prerequisite for foreign direct investment inflows into the Jordanian economy.”). 
Furthermore, a recent study found that, in relation to trademark protection, “Judges 
in Jordan explained that TRIPS-Plus is helpful because it raises awareness of and 
respect for IPR among the domestic population and provides foreign investors with 
greater comfort in doing business in the country. The enforcement provisions of 
the FTA also provided additional flexibility that judges could use when meting out 
penalties and sentences, and there were many technical assistance training sessions 
and workshops that reportedly would not have happened without the FTA.” See 
KOFF ET AL., supra note 28, at 29. 
 76. MICHAEL P. RYAN & JILLIAN SHANEBROOK, INT’L INTELLECTUAL PROP. 
INST., ESTABLISHING GLOBALLY-COMPETITIVE PHARMACEUTICAL AND BIO-
MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRIES IN JORDAN: ASSESSMENT OF BUSINESS 
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multinational presence, medical tourism has taken on new 
importance, and the number of clinical trials in the country has 
multiplied. The study continues by stating that intellectual property 
reforms in Jordan have motivated local industry to cultivate a great 
deal of “business activity that is intellectual property−intensive and 
high value-added.”77 
Once again, emerging evidence contradicts these claims. In its 
2007 study on the U.S.-Jordan FTA, Oxfam International published 
the following findings:  
• There has been nearly no FDI by foreign drug companies in 
Jordan since 2001 to synthesize or manufacture medicines 
in partnership with local generics companies, and this has 
harmed public health. The only FDI into Jordan by foreign 
drug companies has been to expand scientific offices, which 
use aggressive sales tactics to ensure that expensive 
patented medicines are used in lieu of inexpensive generics.  
• Stricter intellectual property rules have not encouraged 
companies in Jordan to engage in R&D for medicines since 
the passage of the FTA, thus these companies have not 
developed any new medicines.  
• New product launches in Jordan are only a fraction of total 
product launches in the USA and the EU. Many new 
medicines launched in Jordan are exorbitantly priced and 
unaffordable for ordinary people. Few or no units of these 
recently launched medicines have actually been purchased 
on the local market.78 
Others have reached similar conclusions in studying the impact of 
expanding intellectual property protection in Jordan. One author, for 
instance, states that “there is little, if any, relationship between FDI 
and intellectual property standards, and . . . numbers constantly used 
to prop up such a connection for Jordan are misused and cartoon-like 
in their simplicity.”79 
 
STRATEGIES AND THE ENABLING ENVIRONMENT 20 (2004). 
 77. Id. 
 78. OXFAM INT’L, supra note 59, at 20. 
 79. Nesheiwat, supra note 75, at 364. 
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Similar findings were reiterated by U.S. Embassy cables. A 2008 
cable explains that the withdrawal of the multinational 
pharmaceutical giant Bristol Myers Squibb (“BMS”) from the 
Jordanian market had, in fact, caused anxiety in the country.80 This 
came following a statement made by the BMS vice president that the 
company was about to close its Jordanian sales operations and that 
its products would no longer be available for sale in the country. This 
step was “part of a larger corporate strategy”; the BMS vice 
president reported that this had nothing to do with the “local political 
situation, the security situation, the ease/difficulty of doing business, 
nor Jordan’s intellectual property rights (“IPR”) record.”81 The cable 
added that the decision was met with “serious concerns and 
confusion” by Jordanian businessmen, doctors, and government 
officials.82  
Furthermore, officials were concerned that this move, which 
placed Jordan alongside countries such as Syria, Sudan, and Yemen 
(from which BMS was also withdrawing), would send a negative 
signal about Jordan’s business environment and would also limit the 
availability of cancer drugs to its nationals. Jordanian government 
officials made innumerable calls to the regional representative of 
PhRMA, arguing that Jordan’s “efforts to improve IPR and the 
attractiveness of the market are wasted if companies pull-out.”83 
Despite Jordan’s commitment to provide higher levels of intellectual 
property protection, the government was unable to persuade BMS to 
change its decision to close its operations. Evidently, higher 
intellectual property levels had no positive impact on the company’s 
decision. PhRMA was in no mood to ride against the tide of a U.S. 
firm and defend Jordan’s interests. 
The example cited above clearly demonstrates that even with an 
FTA containing a TRIPS-Plus protection regime, there are no 
guarantees that powerful countries will seek to encourage their 
MNEs to invest in developing-country partners, or even to preserve 
 
 80. U.S. Embassy, Cable 08AMMAN3017, US Pharmaceutical Company 
Pulling Out of Jordan Creates Anxiety and New Opportunities (Nov. 5, 2008), 
http://cables.mrkva.eu/cable.php?id=176772. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
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and sustain the level of investments that had already been established 
prior to the signing of the FTA. 
As this section reveals, the United States used various techniques 
in pushing its TRIPS-Plus agenda, engaging a broad range of 
Jordanian partners in the process. But an important question arises: 
what lessons did the United States learn from its FTA experience 
with Jordan?  
To avoid any misinterpretation following the implementation of an 
FTA, the United States revised its standard intellectual property 
provisions for subsequent FTAs. Subsequent FTAs included more 
detailed and comprehensive chapters dealing with intellectual 
property protection than the chapter included under the U.S.-Jordan 
FTA. For example, while the U.S.-Jordan FTA included only five 
pages dedicated to intellectual property protection, the subsequent 
U.S.-Oman and U.S.-Bahrain FTAs each included twenty-five pages 
of intellectual property commitments.84 Therefore, despite the 
negative effects stemming from intellectual property measures within 
Jordan’s FTA, one might argue that Jordan was blessed to be the first 
country to sign an FTA with the United States. 
VI. AN UNFINISHED AGENDA?  
THE MORE THE MERRIER  
The agencies and groups representing U.S. interests operate 
through an organized agenda that requires collaboration and 
coordination of their efforts. The process often follows a clear and 
defined pattern, summarized as follows. First, the U.S. Embassy 
staff, in collaboration with multinational companies, identifies an 
issue of interest (either a problem of current concern to U.S. industry 
 
 84. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and 
the Government of the Kingdom of Bahrain on the Establishment of a Free Trade 
Area, U.S.-Bahr., Sept. 14, 2004, http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-
agreements/bahrain-fta/final-text; Agreement Between the Government of the 
United States of America and the Government of the Sultanate of Oman on the 
Establishment of a Free Trade Area, U.S.-Oman, Jan. 19, 2006, 
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/oman-fta/final-text; 
Mohammed El Said, Surpassing Checks, Overriding Balances and Diminishing 
Flexibilities: FTA-IPRs Plus Bilateral Trade Agreements – From Jordan to Oman, 
8 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 243, 261 (2007). 
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groups or the need for a legislative reform in the host country). Then 
discussions are initiated with several local agencies and authorities. 
This process often includes engagement through the provision of 
advice, propositions for reform, and—depending on the nature of the 
issue concerned—the use of stick-and-carrot techniques, if needed.  
The following example demonstrates this process by describing 
how U.S. industry groups attempted to achieve their objectives in 
advocating TRIPS-Plus standards in the area of copyright protection 
and enforcement in Jordan.  
In one of the cables dating back to 2003, a U.S. Embassy official 
reported that meetings with a number of Jordanian officials took 
place to discuss a complaint related to the importation of pirated 
software from Syria into the country.85 The complaint was initiated in 
2002 by Electronic Arts (a U.S. entertainment software developer) 
and was subsequently brought to the attention of the USPTO and the 
U.S. Embassy in Jordan by the IIPA. The main claim, according to 
the cable, was that Jordanian customs authorities had been releasing 
unauthorized copies of Electronic Arts’ software, which was 
imported from Syria into the local market without first seeking the 
opinion of the National Library (the entity responsible for copyright 
enforcement in Jordan). Electronic Arts asserted that Jordanian 
customs had instead relied on approvals from the Ministry of 
Information’s Censorship Office, which has no copyright 
enforcement authority, as the basis for releasing the pirated goods.86  
Although the initial assessment put forth in the U.S. Embassy cable 
explains that the cause of this infraction was a “communications 
breakdown within Jordan’s piracy interdiction system,”87 the cable 
reassuringly explains that it was not “a willful attempt to circumvent 
the existing IPR protection regime” in the country.88 The cable further 
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states that “[n]evertheless, our interviews have highlighted gaps in the 
current system that we hope to begin addressing through increased 
training and retooling of the procedural and legislative framework for 
IPR protection in Jordan.”89 Taking advantage of the presence of a 
high-level Jordanian delegation in Washington for a concurrent 
economic meeting, the USPTO took it upon itself to raise the 
complaint to the Jordanian Industry and Trade Minister, who in turn 
promised to review the complaint upon his return to the country.90 
Subsequent meetings took place, which followed up on the complaint 
and relayed U.S. concerns about Jordan’s intellectual property regime. 
These meetings included representatives from the Ministry of Industry 
and Trade, the Customs Directorate, the Amman Customs House, the 
Jaber Border Crossing with Syria, the National Library, and the 
Censorship Office. Ultimately, the Amman Customs House admitted 
that such activity did take place in the past, due to a lack of 
coordination amongst concerned agencies, but assured the U.S. 
Embassy official that this would not be a problem in the future.91 
Finally, the cable states that the U.S. Embassy was considering a 
request for provision of additional training for line officers at border 
points on intellectual property issues. The cable called for a review of 
current intellectual property legislation and suggested that new 
mechanisms were needed to ensure better coordination between the 
concerned public authorities to enhance the National Library’s ability 
to initiate enforcement and confiscation actions. The majority of 
prescribed measures are classified as TRIPS-Plus in their nature.  
This, however, was not the end of the story. Subsequent cables 
show a high level of persistence and determination in U.S. efforts to 
enforce its intellectual property−related demands. As Jordan was 
expected to comply with its TRIPS-Plus FTA obligations, shortly 
after the signing of the FTA, an opportunity arose. To ensure full 
compliance, the United States tied intellectual property legislative 
(including copyright) reform to its promise of much-needed 
financial and economic assistance. Accordingly, amendments to the 
national copyright legislation were reviewed as part of the USAID-
sponsored “conditions precedent.” This exercise was tied to aid-
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related cash transfers, making it clear that only when legislative 
changes were undertaken would economic assistance be provided.92 
As a result, on March 31, 2005, a new FTA-compliant copyright 
law containing several TRIPS-Plus conditions was published in the 
official gazette.  
One would think that the amendment to the copyright law would 
suffice, thereby bringing the issue to an end. Unfortunately, this was 
not the case. The cables, once again, reveal ongoing monitoring and 
surveillance, aimed toward ensuring a high level of enforcement and 
compliance with the new copyright law. In addition, the cables 
identified other weak enforcement procedures and measures that, 
from the U.S. point of view, required reform. In 2005, the U.S. 
Embassy in Amman reported that “[w]ithin days of the [copyright] 
law’s publication, the enforcement unit based in the National Library 
conducted raids on 40 to 50 shops along Amman’s Garden Street.”93 
The cable also stated that the raids were directed toward software 
piracy activities, in which pirated software was confiscated and 
infringers were referred for prosecution, in accordance with the new 
copyright law. The cable affirmed a desire to ensure compliance and 
expressed fears about the weakness of penalties imposed upon 
infringers, stating that the United States “will attempt to follow these 
cases through the courts to identify and report strengths or 
weaknesses of the enforcement system.”94  
Interestingly, the same cable shows some frustration with the 
judiciary’s lack of enthusiasm for laying down severe penalties 
against the infringers; it argued for the need to send a clearer 
message that “crime does not pay.”95 As more awareness and 
training were needed to ensure proper enforcement, the National 
Library, with the assistance of USAID, planned to launch a public 
campaign on intellectual property awareness and enforcement in the 
country. A key aim of the campaign would be to “convince the 
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judiciary to enforce the new penalties available under the Copyright 
Law.”96 The cable clearly identified the judiciary as the next 
institution to be targeted in its quest for stricter intellectual property 
enforcement.  
By observing global developments, it becomes evident that these 
national discussions were not isolated from those taking place 
internationally. In 2009, the IIPA submitted to the USTR a Special 
Mention report on Jordan, highlighting some of the main areas of 
concern (some of which were already included under the U.S.-Jordan 
FTA). These areas included:  
• Anti-Circumvention and Technological Protection 
Measures (“TPMs”) 
• Appropriately Narrow Exceptions and Limitations 
• Compensatory Damages 
• Deterrent Statutory Maximum Fines 
• Seizure of Documentary Evidence 
• Ex Officio Enforcement Authority 
• Presumptions of Ownership and Subsistence of Copyright 
• Fixing Provision Allowing Alteration of Features in Seized 
Materials, Which Impinges on Exclusive Adaptation Right 
• Customs/Border Provisions97  
Unsurprisingly, most of these issues, which were raised at the 
domestic level in Jordan, were discussed and later included in the 
highly controversial Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 
(“ACTA”) in 2011.98  
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VII. OURS VS. THEIRS  
One of the interesting insights the cables reveal is the relationship 
between the major players (mainly the European Union and United 
States) and the processes by which each perceives and monitors the 
other’s initiatives in developing countries. Although competing 
interests may dictate different strategies and approaches, both the 
European Union and the United States are united in their vision for 
raising the levels of intellectual property protection globally, through 
various means including bilateral free trade and association 
agreements.99  
Although Jordan signed an association agreement (“AA”) with the 
European Union in 1997, before inking an FTA with the United 
States in 2001, it took five years to ratify the E.U. agreement. 
Quipping about such a slow process, a 2002 U.S. Embassy cable 
highlights the slowness and weakness of the E.U. AA, which 
contains mild intellectual property obligations in comparison to those 
in the U.S. FTAs. In the cable, U.S. officials brushed away fears 
about its impact, stating that the E.U. agreement “does little for 
Jordan’s Economy” and that the long ratification process had, in fact, 
“frustrated Jordan and embarrassed the E.U. diplomats [t]here.”100  
At the same time, the cables highlight the United States’ real 
concern regarding the E.U.-Jordan AA: its fear of the European 
Union’s attempt to bring Jordan and other partner countries in the 
region in line with the European Union’s position on a number of 
global issues currently subject to international debate. These issues 
included labeling, genetically modified organisms (“GMOs”), 
Sanitary Phytosanitary SPS measures, and other similar issues in the 
WTO. One cable concludes that the U.S. Embassy in Amman will 
“continue to monitor these efforts, and to work closely with the 
[government of Jordan] to ensure it maintains its close partnership 
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with the U.S. on central WTO issues.”101 
Once again, this example shows the close and detailed monitoring 
carried out by the United States with respect to developing countries’ 
interactions with other global players. It uncovers deliberate U.S. 
aspirations and efforts to restore the balance in its favor, thus 
preventing other major players from molding and influencing 
developing countries’ position under the international framework.  
VIII. THE FTAS CLUB  
The cables further uncover a global aspiration that the United 
States aims to achieve by linking its FTA partnerships. Accordingly, 
the United States is using its FTAs to form alliances and groups that 
would support its positions globally. This vision is not confined to 
the United States; the European Union attempts to achieve a similar 
outcome in the Arab world through its Barcelona Process and the 
subsequent association agreements it has signed with a number of 
Arab states. However, the U.S. position is unique as a result of the 
politics and techniques it adopts to achieve that goal.  
In 2003, a U.S. Embassy cable reported that Singapore’s Trade 
Minister had passed a letter to the King of Jordan during the World 
Economic Forum, hosted in Jordan, proposing an FTA between Jordan 
and Singapore.102 Although an agreement of this nature would seem a 
natural progression of the relationship between both countries as a 
result of Singapore’s historical good relations with the region and its 
Muslim community, one must take note of the U.S. role in steering the 
two countries toward a closer relationship. Notably, both countries had 
just signed an FTA with the United States. Thus, the question arises as 
to where the idea of the Singapore-Jordan FTA originated. 
The cable states that a senior Singaporean trade official had told 
Singapore’s acting political and economic counsel that the Middle 
East is “an important region, but one where Singapore’s economic 
engagement has been minimal.”103 The cable goes further, indicating 
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that the idea of the Singapore-Jordan FTA had “initially been raised 
by then USTR Barshefsky, when the U.S. and Singapore were 
planning to use the U.S.-Jordan FTA as a model for the U.S.-
Singapore FTA.”104 Shortly thereafter, in 2004, the Jordan-Singapore 
FTA was signed.  
IX. CONCLUSION 
The recent release of U.S. Department of State cables provided the 
public with a rare opportunity to view the back-door initiatives and 
discussions involved in shaping and regulating intellectual property 
between developed and developing countries through the use of 
FTAs. From the U.S. position, this represents a historical 
continuation of previous initiatives aimed toward raising the levels of 
intellectual property rights globally. These efforts have been carried 
out with little consideration for other countries’ interests. Remarks 
made by President Obama in 2010 suggest that this policy will 
continue with the same vigor in the near future:  
What’s more, we’re going to aggressively protect our intellectual 
property. Our single greatest asset is the innovation and the ingenuity and 
creativity of the American people. It is essential to our prosperity and it 
will only become more so in this century. But it’s only a competitive 
advantage if our companies know that someone else can’t just steal that 
idea and duplicate it with cheaper inputs and labor. There’s nothing 
wrong with other people using our technologies, we welcome it—we just 
want to make sure that it’s licensed, and that American businesses are 
getting paid appropriately. That’s why USTR [the United States Trade 
Representative] is using the full arsenal of tools available to crack down 
on practices that blatantly harm our businesses, and that includes 
negotiating proper protections and enforcing our existing agreements, and 
moving forward on new agreements, including the proposed Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement.105 
It is unlikely that this aggressive trend related to intellectual 
property enforcement in developing countries will undergo significant 
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change. On January 24, 2012, in his State of the Union speech, 
President Obama promised additional measures and assured American 
industries of the U.S. position in protecting its interests, by stating:  
It’s not right when another country lets our movies, music, and software 
be pirated . . . . Tonight, I’m announcing the creation of a Trade 
Enforcement Unit that will be charged with investigating unfair trade 
practices . . . . There will be more inspections to prevent counterfeit or 
unsafe goods from crossing our borders.106  
Indeed, one would question the prudence of this policy in the long 
run.107 However, this aggressive posture ignores the historical 
policies adopted by the United States during its transition to 
industrialization and innovation, which were heavily reliant on 
others’ innovations. On the other hand, the U.S. position raises some 
questions about the prudence of this, for both the United States and 
the global community. As one author explains:  
The United States’ aggressive decades-long push to ratchet up intellectual 
property protections may come back to haunt it sooner than later. It is 
easy to imagine that in the not-too-distant future, US consumers will be 
paying more royalties to foreign rights holders. Pharmaceutical innovation 
virtually has come to a halt in the US, with many blockbuster drugs about 
to come off patent and very little new drugs in the pipeline. Many critics 
contend that the US patent system is choking off innovation with strategic 
patenting, patent thickets, and overly broad claims. Numerous in-depth 
critiques of the US patent system have raised profound questions about 
the wisdom of exporting our broken and dysfunctional system.108 
On the other hand, the recent developments—or revolutions—
taking place in the Arab world, witnessed in the emergence of the 
“Arab Spring,” are changing how governments are responding to 
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their citizens’ aspirations. At the heart of these revolutions lies the 
call for a more balanced, participatory, and transparent national 
decision-making process. Careful consideration of the public interest 
is fundamental for successful decision-making and policy-setting. 
One is hopeful that the regulation of intellectual property at the 
national levels is no exception.  
Though often referred to as an “oasis of calm” in a turbulent 
region,109 Jordan is not isolated from the recent developments in the 
Middle East. The country is experiencing an unprecedented wave of 
reform championed by King Abdullah II.110 References to political 
and economic reform, transparency, and the fight against corruption 
are commonplace in present-day headlines in Jordan. One can hope 
that these developments and calls will reach those involved in 
intellectual property policy-making and prompt them to adopt a more 
balanced and participatory approach by engaging concerned 
stakeholders and placing the public interest at the center of policy-
making. For now, however, the morning after the signing of an FTA 
remains a stormy one.  
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